In war, as in any organizational leadership, the question becomes a matter of “If this is the state of things, how do I change it and what will my influence/decisions/actions do to the system? Put another way, how does Sean Gourley’s statistical presentation of what IS the case (collecting historical statistics) relate to what MIGHT be the case (future state of the system)?
I can see the possibility of building projections from Gourley’s work that will, depending on whether the system in question is simple, complex, complicated or chaotic, be largely incorrect. Does finding this pattern that exists all over make the information meaningful?
I am a researcher and writer specialising on international development and humanitarian issues.
I am currently working on a number of consulting and advisory assignments for international agencies. I am also writing a book on complexity sciences and international aid which will be published by Oxford University Press.
I hold Senior Research Associate and Visiting Fellow positions at the Institute of Development Studies, the Overseas Development Institute, and the London School of Economics.
In war, as in any organizational leadership, the question becomes a matter of “If this is the state of things, how do I change it and what will my influence/decisions/actions do to the system? Put another way, how does Sean Gourley’s statistical presentation of what IS the case (collecting historical statistics) relate to what MIGHT be the case (future state of the system)?
I can see the possibility of building projections from Gourley’s work that will, depending on whether the system in question is simple, complex, complicated or chaotic, be largely incorrect. Does finding this pattern that exists all over make the information meaningful?